Communist Party of Greece

Special issue: The Communist International

Timely thoughts on the 80th anniversary of the Communist International

Aleka Paparigha

15.03.2000

The founding of the Third International (or Communist International) in 1919 and its subsequent activity can without doubt be included among the greatest political events of the 20th century, with a beneficial effect on the worldwide communist and working class movement.

What separates the Third International from the two previous ones was, first of all, that it bore the stamp of the first victorious socialist revolution, as well as the consequences of the disintegration of the Second International.

The Third International came into being out of the sharpened ideological and political confrontation that had manifested itself during the Second International around the major theoretical and practical issues that were usually formulated then as problems related to: democratic liberties under capitalism, the issue of winning power, the conditions under which it would be possible for the working class and their allies to win power, and the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The spark that lit the fire and led to the disintegration of the Second International was not a minor incident, but THE EVENT: the nature of the war, and the breach of the Basel Conference declarations in 1912 by most of the parties in the Second International, which failed to implement the anti-war decisions. When the war broke out, they sided with their governments, and indeed from the very first moment, voted in favour of military expenditure, i.e. taking a decisive step which ultimately brought them into the camp of the champions of imperialist policy.

Lenin pointed out that the foundation of the Communist International meant the recording not only of the gains achieved by the masses of the Russian proletariat but also those won by the proletariats of Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and those of the struggle for victory by the working people of the entire world. (V.I. Lenin, Complete works, Vol 37, p. 512.)

The dynamic of the Third International did not arise exclusively from the revolutionary enthusiasm generated by the victory of the socialist revolution. It stemmed mainly from the confirmation of the position that the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism was not only necessary but also possible. Its moving force was the assessment which is valid to this day despite ups and downs and temporary regressions that humanity is living in a period of the passage from capitalism to socialism.

From the first moment of its foundation, the Third International had to face not only tough opposition from imperialism, but also the spread of opportunism, i.e. the bourgeois ideology's deeper and more substantial penetration of the labour movement.

Lenin quite correctly pointed out that the Third International had been in the preparatory stage for a good many years and then took place in order that socialists not recognise the socialist revolution in words alone, and in order for unity in action to be won by those communist parties that were capable of proving, through their works and decisiveness, their willingness and ability to introduce into the minds of the working class masses some basic truths that were formulated in a very particular way in that period on the basis of specific current events:

The Third International was active for no fewer than 24 years, at a time when capitalism had already passed to its highest stage, imperialism. The internal rift in the capitalist world had begun to deepen owing to the intra-imperialist conflicts, and its basic feature had manifested itself: war for the redistribution of markets, for the conquest of colonies.

Within the framework of a brief article, it is impossible to give an account of the entire history of the Third International, and its significant influence on the growth of the communist parties, the majority of which were taking their first steps, under unbelievably difficult circumstances, mostly under regimes of persecution and illegality. It is even more difficult to attempt a satisfactory analysis of the ideological and political course taken by the International under rapidly changing conditions.

It is no exaggeration to argue that from the first moment of its establishment, the Third International sought to deepen its understanding of the major theoretical and practical problem of how to introduce tactics into the struggle for a strategic goal, which is the overthrow of capitalism, the realisation of the socialist revolution.

This issue cannot be resolved by definition solely because every single party or all parties together have adopted the scientific theory of socialism. And despite the findings by the officials of the International, i.e. that mistakes and ill-advised choices were made, what we must hold on to today is its dedication to studying the theoretical and practical issues of tactics and strategy.

The fact that, for a period of time after the October Revolution, the Communist International adopted the position that there was a possibility of the immediate victory of socialism in countries other than the USSR certainly played an important role. In addition, a significant role was played by the tested experience of the Bolshevik party, which was the first and pre-eminent party that had been able to demonstrate its all-round ability to link the daily struggle with the long-term goal, to chart the successful strategy that transformed the mature reality of the time into history's first victorious socialist revolution.

Leninist teaching set its seal on the process of working out and mapping the tasks of the Third International. From there too stemmed the special position of the CPSU within the ranks of the international communist movement, especially at a time when experience of the revolution and the building of socialism could be found nowhere else.

At the third congress of the Communist International in 1921, Lenin asserted that the first period revolutionary upsurge after the war was over. The working class was at the centre of a sharpened counter-attack, and there were difficulties and complex tasks ahead of the communist movement. It was perceived that the revolution could not continue at a stormy pace. Despite this, Lenin, as the leader of the Bolshevik party, did not recommend abandoning the strategic objective, and noted the need for attention to be focused on the working class, on the task of raising its struggle to a political one, adapting rather than abandoning the struggle for socialism, but to conditions where this struggle would take on a long-term character.

At that very same period, the deeper social roots and causes that permitted the development of deviations of a rightist and leftist nature, as it was customary then to distinguish them, appeared more clearly. On the grounds of the unfulfilled expectations of the immediate victory of the revolution in other countries, and on the grounds of the difficulties under the new conditions when relative capitalist stabilisation had set in, ideological conflict flared up within the International.

I believe that it would prove very useful, for a number of reasons and not just historical ones, to study the ideological confrontation at that period. The tactics of opportunism and the transformation of a leftist deviation into a rightist one offer valuable experience that would be particularly useful today because, in the final analysis, it has been proved that whatever changes may have taken place, and there have been many, the opportunists' methodology is no different and, above all, the content of their ideas and arguments has not changed.

Reading Lenin's polemic against rightist deviations and the left-wing «infantile disorder», one becomes even more aware of how little has changed. Reading the materials from this period, the few we have at our disposal, one can easily understand that it was not very difficult for a dogmatic leftist viewpoint and a rightist opportunistic one (these are the terms encountered in the documents of the Communist movement) to coincide, to converge ultimately on the same goal, which was to slander Marxist-Leninist theory; they both struck relentlessly at the dictatorship of the proletariat and the communist party.

From the moment when opportunism is the reflection of the bourgeois ideology in the labour movement, the latter is deprived of any potential or margins for significant renewal or the development of ideas, even for thematic updating. The bourgeois ideology also has its limits, as the ideology of a system which is not eternal, which is headed down the road of degradation and decline.

After the Third International was dissolved, there was a visible, gradual trend toward the slackening of common thinking about issues related to the strategy of the communist movement; this was due to many reasons, of course, and not solely to the fact that the united central leadership of the communist movement had ceased to function.

I believe it is worth remembering, even at the risk of simplification, some of the most basic discussions in the Third International around the question of how the working class and its allies could take power, and how the various other movements, national anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and national liberation movements, could join together in a single front with the communist movement in the fight against imperialism.

The Third International, at its very first congress, adopted and developed to some degree under pressure from the particular circumstances the Leninist positions about imperialism, the revolutionary situation, the possibility of the victory of socialism in one or more countries. It put forward the differences between proletarian and bourgeois democracy, revealed the roots of left-wing and right-wing opportunism, and set the task of helping immature communist parties to be transformed into parties of the new type.

One of the most important issues to engage the attention of the Third International in its subsequent course and at its congresses was the problem of the alliances of the working class, particularly the alliance with the farmers, in conjunction with the problem of winning power.

Initially, the position was formulated about creating a united working class front in order to elect a workers' government, which along the way would evolve into a workers' and farmers' front.

Regarding the conditions of the national liberation movement in the colonies, the idea was developed of a single anti-imperialist front. In any event, the nature of the front and especially its dynamics would be determined by the leading role of the Party.

The directive that all party members would have to become propagandists, organisers, and educators of the popular masses occupied a primary position in the decisions taken.

According the thinking then, a workers' government could be formed on a parliamentary basis, but closely related to the revolutionary struggle, relying on the masses and strengthening the revolutionary struggle. For some countries, this constituted an immediate task; to others was given the task of agitation, depending on the correlation of forces. This government was not identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it was considered that the consistent application of the compulsory measures that would have to be taken could prepare for the passage to socialism.

Strong discussions developed and differences of viewpoints around the issue of the workers' government. Support for the opportunistic view was also expressed particularly in the developed capitalist countries, i.e. that there were possibilities for such a government to have a long-term existence within the framework of a bourgeois democracy.

Under the conditions of a national liberation movement, the International supported the formation of national revolutionary and farmers' political groupings but without their replacing the action of the communist parties. It regarded these groupings more as mass organisations within whose bosom the entire debate would take place between the bourgeois and communist parties over winning the leading role.

The ideological debate in the Third International devoted considerable time to the nature of the transitional period and the transitional slogans that would help attract the working class masses to the socialist revolution.

Lenin in particular contributed his own thoughts and the experience of the Russian revolution by putting forward the position that, at a time when the objective conditions did not exist for calling the people to socialism, it was important to organise and step up the struggle that could lead to the final objective. The International worked out the tactics for creating a unified proletarian front, and for drawing in the semi-proletarian petty bourgeois strata that consisted chiefly of farmers at that period and a section of petty bourgeois employees and intellectuals.

Thus a significant discussion developed, although not free of mistakes and vacillations by the still young communist parties, around the issue of how the working class masses could be drawn into the workers' revolutionary movement through their problems, and how cooperation could be achieved on a social level with both the rank and file and the leadership of social democracy.

The stance toward social democracy was not a simple matter. On the one hand there had to be a unifying policy in the struggles waged together with the significant section of the working class who were influenced by social democracy, and on the other, account had to be taken of the fact that its parties had gone over to overt anti-communism and anti-sovietism.

Along the way, the leading bodies of the Third International realised that the tactic of the united front was not understood in a uniform manner by all parties. Some parties saw it as a risk that communist parties would be merged with social democracy, and many parties used it as a pretext for adopting reformist positions.

We must keep in mind that these discussions and ideological debates were going on at a time when people could see that there was a revolutionary upswing of the movements, despite the fact that there was no immediate likelihood of a socialist revolution in other countries.

Early in 1924, the International noted a rise in the capitalist economy and its relative stabilisation. At the same time, it noted that this stability was entirely relative. Life rapidly vindicated this position, as the Depression occurred just a few years later, which demonstrated more clearly the development of new hubs of intra-imperialist conflicts, as was stressed, that ultimately led to the outbreak of World War II.

The relative stabilisation of capitalism led to the strengthening of opportunist views regarding «organised capitalism». They even reached the point of claiming that imperialism was no longer interested in markets and colonies.

And once more it became obvious that the pressure of the bourgeois ideology was strong within the ranks of the working class and communist movement, and that this pressure simultaneously lent momentum to dogmatic-leftist views.

The fight against fascism and effort to avert the war focused the attention of the International, although it would seem that a more profound working out and substantial addressing of ideological devations had not yet taken place.

The contribution of the Third International to working out the policy of the Popular Front to combat fascism and war is well known. Its unifying initiatives in face of war and fascism became the characteristic feature of communist party policy particularly in Europe. Irrespective of the results of this policy under the particular conditions, irrespective of any thoughts or discussions one might have after the fact, and in the light of the new experience, it is certain that action on the Popular Front contributed to broadening the unity and common action of the working class, and above all, it provided a wealth of experience with respect to the policy of alliances at the movement level. Despite the fact that many years have elapsed since then and significant changes have taken place, it would be very useful even as a historical study of the experience of the communist movement, for this period to become an object of in-depth study, especially the discussions in the Third International on alliance issues, and on matters related to the linking of tactics and strategy. For the communist movement, and for each communist party separately, the policy of alliances constitutes one of the most complex issues.

With the outbreak of World War II, the self-dissolution of the Third International, and subsequent developments a deeper assessment of the role and significance of the International on matters related to the strategy of the communist movement proved to have been impossible.

One of the problems characteristic of the rapid growth of the communist movement was that it was not accompanied, to the necessary degree, by the clear-headed, collective critical assessment of experience, in order that mistakes could be corrected, and positions could be adjusted or developed on the basis of a methodical analysis of changing reality and of generalised experience from the class revolutionary stuggle, always based on the principles of our revolutionary theory.

It is hardly accidental that the Third International drew the fire of bourgeois governments, imperialist states and organisations. It became the second thorn in their side, after the October Revolution of course and the establishment of the first dictatorship of the proletariat in history.

After the victory of the counter-revolution, a slander campaign against the Communist International began, showing the usual ignorance of history. The now familiar turncoats took pains, in their known ignorant way and with their irrational and unscientific thought, to declare that never again should there exist on earth any form of organised common action by communist parties, because the International had supposedly damaged the communist parties, led them to mistakes, abolished their independent responsibility and subjugated them all to the CPSU.

This is one more reason to observe that the anniversary of the Third International has brought up the timely issue of unity of action by the communist movement and what organised form it should take.

Regardless of the opinions that have been expressed, the judgements on the particular decisions and choices made by the Third International, regardless of the experience and wisdom that was incidentally won through hindsight, one thing is indisputable: That unity of action cannot be achieved by the communist movement unless it takes on a specific organised form. The communist movement must have a central point of reference. The form that a modern International might take, how the relations between the parties would be structured, and how the uniting factor would be secured given the particularity of conditions faced by each party, certainly constitute problems, issues to be studied and investigated under contemporary conditions, taking into account the positive and negative experience of the past.

Whatever problems may have appeared in the course of the International, they cannot refute the need for the international communist movement to be united like a fist against the equally united class enemy. For the unity of the communist movement to be effective, it cannot but be embodied in some form of organisation, in some form of central organ. This also holds for international associations of liberal and social democratic parties.

Coordinated action by the communist parties, their undertaking of joint action, is a form of international collaboration, but certainly an inferior one, and inadequate for the modern needs.

The best known argument against creating a new Communist International stems from the critical attitude toward the problems that arose in all three Internationals, especially the Third, which constitutes the pre-eminent form of united action by the communist movement up to the present day. Even if we accepted all these critical viewpoints about how the Third International functioned, we cannot adopt the logic of «if the head aches, cut it off».

May I be forgiven for expressing the idea that such a stance sounds naïve, even stupid today, especially when it is supported by parties which, generalising the difficulties, have adopted the view that socialism will either be victorious everywhere and at the same time, or not at all, ignoring the asymmetrical development of capitalism, a fact which is admitted today even by bourgeois parties and bourgeois theoreticians. And even if this view were true which it's not it would be one more reason for a world communist centre to exist, counterbalancing the international and regional associations of imperialism.

Moreover, any problems that appeared in the International were not generated by its existence. They reflected, especially in the early years, the arduous course of maturation of the individual communist parties and the fight against opportunism on the national and international level. One way and another, the problems on the national level were very real. But the International offered a broad field for discussing these common problems, and even for temporary compromises to be found, or for issues to remain open when there was no immediate possibility of arriving at a consensus. How more today could it offer today, when internationalisation has been accelerated, and it is even more difficult than in the past to point out absolutely national features, in contrast with interstate, regional and global organisations.

An important aspect of this argument is that the existence of an international centre, a common international organisation of communist parties, would deprive them of the satisfaction of having independence of responsibility toward the movement in their country, and make it difficult for them to adapt to the special national features.

If we study the most basic published documents from the Third International, we can see that its aim was not simply to lay down the general tasks of the communist movement, but also to point out the particular tasks of the parties, according to the development level of capitalism and to each country's position in the imperialist system.

But the issue goes deeper; it goes down to the very concept of the special national features. Far be it from us to underestimate the specific conditions of struggle from one country to another. But historic experience has shown that, for many parties, the term national features either conceals mistaken thinking about the nature of the revolution, or the influence of opportunist deviations. There was the obvious effect of the great pressure experienced by all parties to join in condemning the so-called Soviet model, adding grist to the anti-Soviet mill.

There is a well known argument that, in the name of internationalism, the communist parties were obliged to defend uncritically the building of socialism in the USSR, the first country to attempt it.

On this particular issue, various aspects and issues become involved, deliberately in most cases.

It was the DUTY of the communist parties, one of their primary duties, and not just a problem of solidarity, to defend the USSR, the first socialist state, that lived under the tragic conditions of encirclement by imperialism; and it was totally unrelated to the crude concept of subjugation to that country's party.

The problem which came to light, especially after the victory of the counter-revolution, i.e. that defence was identified with prettifying the building of socialism, is a different matter. In the final analysis, this problem reflects the influence of two factors: First of all, the fact that few people see and know what is happening inside a party. Second, in the prettification, or in the opposite phenomenon of easy criticism, a role was played by the fact that ideological activity, and the collective effort to develop our theory had become terribly slack in the name of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other parties, in the name of the immediate tasks of the movement, or in the name of ideological disagreements. The nature of international meetings did not permit a broad exchange of views or any substantial exploration of the problems of building socialism. We would note on this occasion that those parties which wanted the loosening of international meetings, which regarded any criticism as intervention in their internal affairs, were precisely the same parties that levelled constant criticism against the socialist system, and kept their distance from the USSR by adopting bourgeois and petty bourgeois criteria about what socialism is and what its basic features constitute.

Today we are perhaps too experienced to worry about how every party should understand the correct position that one party cannot interfere in the internal affairs of another.

Under today's conditions, most of the issues of concern to communist parties are related to international developments, the international working class and communist movement, and the anti-imperialist movement. The same thing was also true in the past, of course, but under present conditions there is less and less emphasis on those issues which might in the past have been included among the national features. In our view, the term national feature should be used with great care, and above all it should not be so flexible as to permit characteristics that stem from the nature of imperialism to be regarded as national features.

For example, does the stance toward the EU and NATO today constitute an individual matter for each party separately?

Is it possible, e.g., for the EU and NATO to be bearers of good to the people of one country and its working class, and to bring tragedy to the people of another country?

Can the attitude toward imperialist war, such as for example was waged in the Balkans and elsewhere, possibly constitute a strictly national issue for one party or the other? Does the stance taken on the scientific theory of socialism, the stance toward the socialism we have known, constitute a matter of national choice for a communist party?

The issues of concern to CPs today, from the policy of alliances and the road to socialism to the particular attitude toward imperialist organisations, are matters of more general significance. When one party makes the wrong choices, it can also make another party's position objectively more difficult. Was it a minor matter that we experienced in the recent war against Yugoslavia, when there were CPs participating in governments that played a special role in the bombings, or was it a minor matter for them to try and somehow justify the war on the pretext of Milosevic's so-called national cleansing?

That is, if one or many parties criticise these particular communist parties, does this mean intervention in their internal affairs?

There are issues on which one party certainly cannot appear to judge another, much less to intervene in its action, such as questions of tactical choices, and even alliances, although in this field the national and local features are becoming ever more limited. Nor is it easy for a party to be sure it has all the facts in order to judge the choices made on all issues by another party in the latter's own country, even on issues of building socialism. It is essential to have comradely discussion of the various viewpoints, the expression of opinions among parties, because otherwise bilateral and multilateral meetings will take on that character which most of us witnessed at the international meetings held before the reversals, i.e. their formal nature, with each delegate talking about his own issues, as though we were strangers among ourselves. When criticism is made publicly, it must be expressed in such a way as to help and to convince, and certainly not to be exploited by the policy of divide and rule, which is systematically attempted by the various agents and handmaidens of imperialism.

The truth is that we are today still relatively far removed from a fruitful discussion about the forms in which the unity of the international communist movement could be restored under present conditions.

We are far removed, not because we don't need an International, but because the crisis in the international communist movement has not been overcome, and there are serious ideological differences that stand in the way of such a development.

But this does not mean that we should underestimate other forms of common action that help the global communist, anti-imperialist movement gain strength. This does not mean that we shouldn't be making constant efforts not only to foster substantial bilateral contacts but also multilateral meetings without exclusions, meetings that could help coordinatation and common action wherever there is agreement, as well as meetings to discuss current ideological and theoretical issues. At these meetings it is necessary and useful to discuss any existing differences rather than simply to talk generally and abstractly about what we agree on. Comradely ideological debate is beneficial. While no party can impose its views on another, this doesn't mean that we don't have the right and the obligation to voice our opinions and to think about the views of others.

The CPG is a party which has held high the banner of proletarian internationalism for 81 years. We have experienced all its aspects, its irreplaceable contribution, as well as the difficulties that were due to ideological quarrels and differences, to inexperience and theoretical inadequacies.

But we never chose to follow the slippery road of announcing what is good about us, the CPG, and bad about the others. We never fell into the trap of justifying our own mistakes or failures, casting the blame somewhere else, outside of us, even if the international choices and decisions affected us adversely.

I think that our party has fallen heir to this «talent» over time, between 1918 and the present: the CPG's internationalism has always been an integral part of its action. This was why internationalist solidarity has been deeply instilled into our working class movement. The significant role our party and the working class movement has played in mobilisations of international importance, such as the case of the dirty war against Yugoslavia, was due to these roots and not solely to our present-day action.

The fact that the CPG, even after the profound crisis it went through between 1989 and 1991, never for a moment stopped taking initiatives, to coordinate and promote common action among communist parties is due to these roots.

And this is how we shall continue, honouring our traditions which are today more relevant and timely than ever before.