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Communist Party of Bulgaria - Ludmil KOSTADINOV - Member of the CC - Editor of the "Rabotnitchesky Vestnik"

The Role of Stalin and of the CP(B) In The Great Patriotic War

The role of Stalin in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany, his historical merits in the defeat of the most powerful war-machine, which ever existed, are well-known: industrialisation, collectivisation, the dismantling, in 1937-1938, of the networks trying to establish the « perestroika » (transformation), the political isolation of the nazi Reich, the production of military materials in large amounts and in due time (the technical genius of Stalin in the choice of the weapons to be built is not so well-known), the victories in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, the ten « Stalinist strikes » of 1944, are unquestionable merits of Stalin and are often cited.

For this reason, I would like to point out two questions, about which either one doesn’t write at all, or for which the analyses of the role of Stalin are incorrect, even among the communists.

The beginning of the Hitlerite aggression

The Soviet leadership, with Joseph Stalin at its head, appraised very correctly the balance of forces at the spring of 1941 and the intentions of Germany. In a speech for the listeners of the academies of the Red Army, on May 5, 1941, Stalin gave clearly its appraisal :

With these few sentences, Stalin expresses his appraisal of the military balance of forces and of the immediate plans of Germany. First, Stalin underlines the strength and the quality of the German army, while alluding to the question of the invincibility of such an army. The second conclusion of the Soviet leader is that the German army can only be defeated at the condition that its war is waged for the conquest of other peoples and countries.

At the same time, the Soviet military leadership underestimated the German army and expressed an unjustified optimism, which resulted in the proposal of June, 15 1941 by people’s commissary, Timochenko, and by the chief of staff, Zhukov: according to this proposal, the Soviet Union had to be the first to attack the Germans in order to answer to the concentration of the German armies at the border… After the death of Stalin, it was widely thought that, if Stalin had accepted that plan, the situation of the USSR at the beginning of the war would have been more favourable.

It is to Zhukov’s credit that, in the 60s, he recognized in an interview by the military historian Anfilov: "Now, I consider that it was better that he (Stalin) disagreed with us at that time. Otherwise, a much more severe catastrophe than the one suffered by our armies near Kharkov in May 1942 would have occurred." Joukov has in mind the attempt of attack, anticipating the one of the German armies, which were preparing an offensive on the South-West front in the region of Kharkov in May 1942, and resulting in the encircling and the defeat of the Soviet armies, which were advancing. The German offensive not only was not thwarted but it started in more favourable conditions, in June 1942.

Zhukov has underlined many times that it was the fact that the German army was stronger, and not the suddenness of its invasion, which was the main reason of the retreat of the Soviet army at the beginning of the war: "Among all the reasons of our failures at the beginning, – he says - I don’t put at the first place the suddenness, that is to say, the fact that our armies would have been surprised by the attack, but the quality of German weaponry, the ability of the Germans in the handling of the war-engines and the competence of the German commanders in the direction of the armies. This is really the reason of our main defeats at the beginning of the war. One must look straight at the truth and not feel oneself annoyed to admit that at the beginning of the war the enemy was much stronger and more experienced than us, better trained, armed and prepared. We learned to fight during the war, we learned and we began to beat the Germans." These words of Zhukov are confirmed by the figures of the losses of the Soviet armies. During the first hours of the war, when the suddenness of the war could have acted, the loss of planes was less than 5% and the losses of other types of weapons and of human lives are even more insignificant.

It is thus obvious that Stalin made a better appraisal of the actual balance of forces at the beginning of the war than the Command of the Red Army.

But, in addition to the purely military considerations, there were other, not less important, considerations to reject the idea of a preventive attack. If the Red Army had attacked first, it would have lost its moral primacy and would have given the opportunity to the nazi propaganda to easily persuade the world that Germany was waging a just war of defence against the « Bolshevik aggression ». In these conditions, the diplomatic isolation of Germany could not have been realized and this would have endangered the formation of an anti-hitlerite coalition. The war against Finland in the winter 1939-1940 is a very clear example of it.

For the same reasons, Stalin had rejected the proposal of Timochenko and Zhukov of June 13, 1941 to set up immediately an open mobilisation and to concentrate the whole army on the Western border. From a diplomatic and mediatic point of view, this variant was not better than the one of the preventive attack. Germany could have presented the open mobilisation as an aggressive act. This variant was also fruitless from a military point of view, which has been recognized by his proponent, Zhukov. After having thought to his past war experience, Zhukov wrote in his "Memories and thoughts", that the mobilisation and the concentration of the Soviet army on the Western border would have in fact made easier the German plans of annihilation of the main forces of the Soviet army, at the West of the Dniepr, in 1941.

Thanks to Stalin, only 50% of the peace-time contingent of the Red Army was on the Western border, and moreover, it was disposed inside, at 400km from the border. These armies have delayed the German offensive, which allowed the mobilisation and the evacuation of the industry of the western regions. Thus, the German command had no chances to reach its main goal: the destruction of the main forces of the Red Army West of the Dniepr. The Nazis were obliged to fight at thousands kilometres from Germany, under the continuous strikes of the Red Army, on a front of thousands of kilometres long, and, behind their lines, under the attacks of their communications roads, long of thousands kilometres, by the popular resistance. They had to attack cities defended by the army and the population. This situation created the conditions of the crushing of the Hitlerite army, considered as invincible.

The price of victory

As the Soviet victory can’t be hidden or denied in front of the world, one tries to minimize it, by underlining that it was acquired with an unjustified figure of casualties. It makes no doubt that the crushing of the Hitlerite war machine demanded many efforts and casualties from the peoples of the Soviet Union. But if one compares, from the point of view of the military art, the losses of the various countries during the war, one can reach conclusive statements.

The picture of the defeat of the « democratic » capitalist countries of Europe was rather sad and pitiful. Austria didn’t oppose any resistance. Czecho-Slovakia capitulated without a single shoot, in spite of the perfect armament of its army and of the mobilization of 1.6 millions of persons. Poland mobilized 1 million of persons and resisted almost one month. France, Belgium and Holland mobilized 5 millions of persons, who resisted till summer 1940. Denmark and Norway showed a symbolic resistance. In Yugoslavia and Greece, 1.5 millions of persons capitulated in the spring of 1940. Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland even took side with the fascist aggressor. The subjugation of Europe cost to the Nazis around 100,000 definitive human losses. From a military point of view, the definitive losses are the persons killed, missing, the prisoners of war and the ones who capitulated. The definitive military losses of the European countries, which have fought against Germany, can be evaluated to 8 millions of persons, among which 200,000 were killed, the others are prisoners of war or persons who have capitulated. The ratio is 80 for 1 at the advantage of the fascists.

I think that the level of the military art of the armies of « democratic » Europe doesn’t need any comment and the ratio of persons killed to prisoners shows in a very obvious way their spirits. In spite of the fact that they had everything: modern weapons, fortified lines, a powerful navy and « experienced » commanders !

China didn’t resist better to the Japanese aggression, nor Ethiopia to the Italian aggression. Britain and the United States were saved from the defeat by the seas and the oceans.

In the Wehrmacht and in the armies of the satellites countries of fascist Germany in Europe, Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, Hungary, which had mobilized more than 21 millions of peoples, 5 millions have been killed in military actions, and the others have been made prisoners or have surrendered. Three-quarters of these losses have resulted from the actions of the Red Army.

In the Red Army, more than 29 millions of persons have been mobilized during the war. The definitive losses amount to 11.3 millions, among which 8.6 millions have perished on the battlefields or as prisoners, and 2.7 millions have been liberated after the victory.

The ratio of the definitive losses in the war on the Eastern front is of 16 millions in the German army for 11.3 millions in the Soviet army, or 1.4 to 1 in favour of the Red Army. For 4 persons killed in the Red Army, there was one prisoner, while in the fascist armies, the ratio is opposite: for one person killed, there were 4 prisoners.

The conclusion is clear. The Soviet Army and the Soviet military art, in spite of their recoil at the beginning of the war, have outfought the most powerful army of the capitalist world in the course of the war and have secured victory. It is impossible to defeat such an army and to make it capitulate with few casualties. The victory demanded indeed millions of casualties but the defeat would have brought ten times more casualties. One just need to remind the example of Poland, which suffered 66,000 casualties on the battlefield while around 6 millions of Poles perished during the fascist occupation which followed.

The Soviet victory saved the life, in the proper meaning of the word, of hundreds of millions people in the world. The merit of this outcome of the war is incumbent on the Supreme Commander of the Red Army, Joseph Stalin.